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THE EFFECT OF HIGH-TECH SERVICES OFFSHORING ON 
SKILLED EMPLOYMENT: INTRA-FIRM EVIDENCE 
 
Abstract: 
The offshoring of high-tech services has greatly increased in recent years, with 
consequences for firms demand for skilled employment in firms. This paper specifically 
analyzes the relationship between R&D offshoring and the demand for R&D 
employment using firm-level data for Spanish manufacturing and services companies 
during the period 2004-2009. Estimating different specifications with panel data 
techniques, we find that this association is statistically positive. In particular, if R&D 
offshoring doubles, the demand for researchers will raise by about 8%.  
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EL EFECTO DEL OFFSHORING DE SERVICIOS DE ALTA TECNOLOGÍA 
SOBRE EL EMPLEO CUALIFICADO: EVIDENCIA INTRA-EMPRESA 
 
Resumen: 
Este trabajo analiza la relación entre el offshoring de I+D y la demanda de 
investigadores utilizando datos de empresas españolas manufactureras y de servicios 
durante el período 2004-2009. A partir de la estimación de una ecuación de demanda de 
investigadores con técnicas de datos de panel, encontramos que esta asociación es 
estadísticamente positiva. En particular, los resultados sugieren que si las empresas 
duplicaran sus compras de servicios de I+D en el extranjero, su demanda de 
investigadores aumentaría alrededor del 8%.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The frequency with which companies have made use of offshoring strategies has greatly 
increased in recent years (OECD, 2010). Although initially offshoring referred mainly 
to intermediate manufacturing goods, over the last decade, the offshoring of 
manufacturing goods has taken a back seat to the offshoring of services, since the 
demand for more advanced services in technical and administrative areas has 
substantially grown (Jensen, 2009; Metters and Verma, 2008).  
 
As a consequence, standardized activities of unskilled workers in manufacturing 
industries have ceased to be the only subject of offshoring and, nowadays, the 
comparative advantage of countries is not only be associated with natural or physical 
capital, but also with human capital. Some countries are specializing in technological 
jobs and in the development of computational concepts, making offshoring a way to 
contract the necessary services for domestic production in other countries, improving 
delivery times and the capacity for interaction, and without having in many cases to 
transport any physical goods.  
 
However, the increase in the offshoring of highly technological services has not 
happened without problems. When a white-collar worker, who is usually better paid 
because of her experience in ICTs and her ability to learn, is “relocated”, some specific 
knowledge of the company is destroyed. As a result of the absence of valuable human 
capital, the incentives of administrators and employees to invest in gaining such specific 
knowledge diminish (Trefler, 2005).  
 
Offshoring of high-tech tasks leads to more frequent separations between workers and 
companies, destroying important dimensions of human capital. It is not clear whether 
the loss of knowledge that arises from the separation of the company and the workers is 
an issue of equity, given that it can be harmful for workers displaced by offshoring, or a 
matter of efficiency, since it destroys valuable human capital.  
 
In this context, many researches have focused on analyzing how materials and services 
offshoring affect the demand for skilled and unskilled workers, or on their impact on 
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wages and welfare. Although the majority of these studies are done on a per-country 
and industry basis, recent studies have attempted to distinguish between different levels 
of education and occupations, suggesting in general that services offshoring generates a 
positive effect on employment and wages for skilled workers and the opposite for 
unskilled workers (Crinò, 2010).   
 
The objective of our study is to contribute to the debate by analyzing the intra-firm 
impact of offshoring on the demand for one of the most qualified workers: researchers 
involved in R&D activities. For this purpose, we use the information of Spanish firms 
available for the period 2004-2009 from the Panel of Technological Innovation PITEC, 
created by the INE (the Spanish Institute of Statistics) on the basis of the annual Spanish 
responses to the Community Innovation Survey (CIS). Due to rising unemployment in 
Spain in recent years, now it is essential to emphasize the discussion about the changes 
needed to achieve sustained long – term growth. According the OECD (2011), Spain 
needs to create policies to increase productivity, encourage greater investment in 
innovative sectors, and channel investment into human capital. This is important in 
order to continue diversifying production and maintaining support for processes such as 
the internationalization of Spanish enterprises.   
 
The specific contribution of our study is twofold: Firstly, we analyze a particular type of 
offshoring: the purchases of R&D services1 that domestic firms contract from foreign 
providers. These highly technological activities may have a stronger effect on the 
demand for skilled labor. Just as Markusen (2005) states, white-collar services that are 
marketed are crucial complements for different elements of the production chain, such 
as between skilled labor and the telecommunications and infrastructure teams.  
Furthermore, Crinò (2010) emphasizes that white-collar workers employed in services 
activities usually do good work and receive high wages. This work requires a high level 
of knowledge, and although in the past they were protected from offshoring, currently 
they are more exposed to it.   
 
 
                                                 
1 R&D services are defined in our database as: “Creative work to increase the volume of knowledge and 
to create new or improved products and processes (including the development of software)”. They 
include, among others, engineering services, clinical tests or designs. 
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Secondly, we use individual firm-level data and therefore the effects of offshoring are 
quantified within the firms that undertake this offshoring. This differs from many other 
studies in this field that use aggregate data for countries or industries or information 
about occupations. In addition, the panel structure of our database allows the use of 
suitable econometric methods to control for the heterogeneity of firms.  
 
Our results suggest the existence of a positive relation between R&D offshoring and 
skilled employment for Spanish firms, providing evidence in favor of their 
complementarity. In addition, we find that this association is stronger in the services 
sector than in the manufacturing sector.  
 
The study has the following structure. In Section 2, we summarize the previous 
literature about the relations between outsourcing, offshoring and skilled labor. Section 
3 includes a description of the empirical model, the database and the main variables. In 
Section 4, we present the results and, finally, in Section 5, we conclude.   
 
2. Outsourcing, offshoring and skilled labor: State of the art 
 
Literature analyzing the impact of international outsourcing on labor markets has 
increased parallel to the process of globalization. From a theoretical point of view, an 
important group of papers follow a Helpman and Krugman (1985) style two-sector 
general equilibrium model of trading countries to identify the forces that can lead to 
increased outsourcing. These studies are a usual theoretical reference in the field of 
international economics.  
 
An example is the model of two countries, North and South, developed by Glass and 
Saggi (2001). They assume that international outsourcing in basic production is 
developed in low-income countries, while northern firms import components that are 
used to finish the production in the north with northern workers. A manufactured good 
is produced (by international outsourcing in the south) with continuous intermediate 
goods that differ in the use of skilled and unskilled workers. All other goods are 
produced in the north. In the model, southern firms perform outsourcing only in the 
basic production of old designs, but new developments and designs are produced in 
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northern countries. Outsourcing is carried out because of technological differences and 
not differences in factor endowment (as in Feenstra and Hanson, 1996a). 
 
In a similar context of two countries, Antrás and Helpman’s model (2004) assumes the 
existence of heterogeneous final-good producers that choose ownership structures and 
locations for the production of intermediate inputs. The equilibrium depends on the 
wage differential between the North and South, on the ownership advantage in each of 
the countries, on the distribution of the bargaining power between final good producers 
and suppliers of components, and on the headquarter intensity of technology. 
 
Also from a macroeconomic perspective, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) argue 
that countries with different stages of development, different technologies and different 
factor endowments generate different factor prices. They wonder about how offshoring 
opportunities affect wages of different types of labor (unskilled labor and skilled labor). 
Production technology is specified in terms of tasks and each task requires the input of 
some single factor of production. The decision to perform tasks through offshoring 
depends on the difference between internal and external prices and communications 
technology. The model assumes that tasks can be performed remotely, so that the 
production of a good can be internationalized.2 
 
Against the above-mentioned models, which allow for explaining the impact of 
offshoring on labor markets from macroeconomic models, a second group of studies 
tries to analyze the same problem from a microeconomic perspective.  These studies 
usually include empirical approximations made with data from a much larger level of 
disaggregation (firm, sector, occupation).  
 
Many of these works have centered in analyzing whether the impact of outsourcing or 
offshoring is different for skilled workers (Hijzen et al., 2005; Canals, 2006; Ekholm 
and Hakkala, 2006; Geishecker and Görg, 2008 and forthcoming). Although these 
studies show different analytic structures and levels of disaggregation of data, in general 
they find that highly skilled workers obtain a wage premium due to international 
outsourcing, which has raised the gap between the wages of skilled workers with respect 
                                                 
2 Offshoring is	costly	in	the	sense	that	performing	a	task	at	a	distance	requires	a	greater	factor	input	
than	if	the	task	is	performed	nearby,	and	tasks	differ	in	their	costs	of	remote	performance.	
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to the wages of unskilled workers in recent periods. This suggests the existence of a 
complementary relationship between international outsourcing and skilled employment, 
although its significance depends on aspects such as the inter-industrial labor mobility 
and labor rigidity, which are also influenced by public policies on labor markets.   
 
Within this second group of studies we want to emphasize the ones that include a 
microeconomic foundation. This is the case of the studies by Amiti and Wei (2006), 
Criscuolo and Garicano (2010), and Crino (2010), who begin with the existence of an 
enlarged production function in which offshoring or outsourcing is incorporated. 
Assuming that firms maintain an optimizing behavior, these authors reach a function of 
labor demand that will be the equation to be estimated in the empirical part.  This will 
be the approach in our study, given the type of empirical approximation that we intend 
to do.3 However, we follow a firm level perspective instead of an industry perspective, 
and we aim to reach a greater specificity in the analysis of the relation between labor 
demand and offshoring, using the information about offshore R&D activities of Spanish 
firms. The sector to which companies belong and the type of technology they use will 
be taken into account, distinguishing between skilled and unskilled workers and 
focusing specifically on the firms’ demand for researchers to perform inside R&D 
activities. 
 
3.  Model and data 
3.1. The model 
 
Given the type of information available in the PITEC database, our methodology 
consists of the estimation of a conditional labor demand function in which the 
offshoring appears as a key determinant. This approach is in line with many papers that, 
since Griliches (1979, 1995), estimate the impact of R&D activities on productivity with 
firm-level data starting from a standard production function that is augmented with a 
kind of technological input.4 In our case, the firm-level production function is 
                                                 
3 A more detailed exposition of the model is done in the next section. 
4 Griffith et al. (2006) follow this approach to provide evidence for technology sourcing from the U.S.. 
The OECD (2007) also uses a similar model to measure the impact on the demand for labour of 
outsourcing production abroad. The model is estimated using sectoral data for 12 OECD countries for 
years 1995 and 2000.  
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augmented with offshoring and internal innovation activities. In particular, the 
production function for firm i in industry j is written as follows:  
௜ܻ௝ ൌ ܣ௜௝൫݋ݏݏ௜௝, ݅݊݊௜௝൯	ܨ௜௝ሺܮ௜௝ோ&஽, ܮ௜௝ை , ܭ௜௝,ܯ௜௝, ௜ܵ௝ሻ    [1] 
where Y represents the output that is a function of labor, ܮ ൌ ܮோ&஽ ൅ ܮை, physical 
capital, K, materials, M, and services used as inputs, S.  Notice that, as we are interested 
in analyzing the impact of R&D offshoring on skilled labor, we distinguish between the 
researchers devoted to R&D activities, ܮோ&஽, which by definition are highly qualified 
workers, and other employees, ܮை. A stands for the technical change, which is a function 
of the offshoring of services, oss and also of innovation activities developed 
domestically by the firm, inn. 
 
As was previously mentioned, in this article our concept of service offshoring refers 
specifically to those activities in research and development carried out abroad, that is, 
purchases of R&D services from foreign providers, which can be firms of the same 
group, firms outside the group, public institutions, universities, etc. We call this concept 
R&D offshoring, which is different from the innovation activities developed 
domestically by the firm5, which we denote by ݅݊݊ in equation (1). 
 
As in Amiti and Wei (2006), we assume that the process of minimizing costs happens in 
two stages: in the first stage, the firm chooses the quantity of traditional inputs, while in 
a second stage it chooses the proportion in which it will import material and service 
inputs.6 We also suppose that all firms in the same industry face identical input prices, 
including imported inputs and physical capital. In this context, the conditional labor 
demand function for R&D employees can be expressed as:   
ܮ௜௝ோ&஽ ൌ ௚ೕ൫࢝ೕ,௢௦௦೔ೕ,௜௡௡೔ೕ,௒೔ೕ൯஺ೕ൫௢௦௦೔ೕ,௜௡௡೔ೕ൯       [2] 
                                                 
5 In particular, this concept includes internal R&D activities (regardless of the remuneration to researchers 
to avoid double accounting), domestic R&D outsourcing and other innovation expenditures. 
6 In addition, the fixed cost of importing services and material inputs may vary by industry. As Amiti and 
Wei (2006) justify, the level of the sophistication of the inputs are different for each industry, and hence 
will involve different amounts of search costs to be imported. 
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where	࢝௝ ൌ ሺݓ௝ோ, ݓ௝ை, ݎ௝	, ݍ௝௠, ݍ௝௦ሻ is the vector of input prices that correspond, 
respectively, to the wages of researchers, the wages of the rest of the employees, the 
rental rate on capital, and the prices for materials and service inputs.  
 
As is common in the empirical literature (Hamermesh, 1993; Criscuolo and Garicano, 
2010; Crinò, 2010), this equation of conditional labor demand will be estimated using 
the following log-linear specification:   
ln ܮ௜௝ோ&஽ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ࢼ࢝ᇱ n࢝࢐ ൅ ൅ߚ௢௦ 	ln ݋ݏݏ௜௝ ൅ 	ߚ௜௡௡ln ݅݊݊௜௝ ൅ ߚ௒ln ௜ܻ௝ ൅ ࢼ࢞ᇱ ࢄ࢏࢐ ൅	ߝ௜௝        [3]	
where X stands for a vector of other control variables that will be explained afterwards 
and  ߝ௜௝ is  the  residual  with  the  usual  properties. In this conditional demand 
function, if R&D offshoring increases productivity, we would expect the offshoring to 
have a negative effect on the demand for R&D employment, since fewer inputs are 
needed to produce the same amount of output. 
 
Alternatively, if we substitute in equation [2] for the firm’s profit maximizing level of 
output, which is also a function of offshoring, the following demand function for R&D 
labor would be obtained: 
ܮ௜ோ&஽ ൌ ௚ೕ൫࢝ೕ,௢௦௦೔,௜௡௡೔ೕ,௣೔൯஺ೕ൫௢௦௦೔,௜௡௡೔ೕ൯      [4] 
which in terms of the log-linear specification will be equivalent to: 
ln ܮ௜௝ோ&஽ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ࢼ࢝	ᇱ ln࢝࢐ ൅ ߚ௢௦ 	ln ݋ݏݏ௜௝ ൅ 	ߚ௜௡௡	ln ݅݊݊௜௝ ൅ ߚ௣	ln ݌௜௝ ൅ ࢼ࢞ᇱ ࢄ࢏࢐ ൅ 	ߝ௜௝        [5] 
 
The way in which offshoring affects labor demand in this equation is not easily 
identifiable, and, furthermore, is one of the main questions we seek to answer in this 
study. In line with Amity and Wei’s (2006) arguments, R&D offshoring could affect the 
demand for researchers through three main channels: 
1) A substitution effect through the price of imported services. A fall in that price 
would lead to a reduction in the demand for researchers if R&D labor and R&D 
services were substitutes. However, the effect could be the opposite if they are 
complements.  
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2) A productivity effect if R&D offshoring leads to improvements in efficiency. Firms 
may produce the same quantity of a product with fewer inputs, reducing their 
demand for labor inputs.  
3) A scale effect if, as R&D offshoring makes the company more efficient and 
competitive, the demand for its product increases and, as a consecuence, the firm 
also hires more employees. 
 
The net effect of R&D offshoring through these three channels will be captured in 
coefficient ߚ௢௦.		In our firm-level context, it is not easy to predict which effect will be 
the predominant effect and in fact this is one of the main questions we want to answer 
empirically in the study.   
 
3.2. Description of the database and main variables 
 
The empirical analysis is done with the information provided in the Panel of Innovation 
Technology (PITEC), from 2004 to 2009. This database is carried out by the INE (The 
Spanish Statistics Institute) and encloses micro-data on Spanish firms’ innovation 
activities and their conditions for scientific research. Although the PITEC includes a 
sample of firms that do not undertake technological activities, given the objective of this 
study, we focus the analysis in the sample of innovative firms, that is, firms that have 
positive innovation expenditures during the period. 
 
This database allows us to study offshoring activities for the highest knowledge 
intensive input: Research and Development (R&D). The database provides information 
about the R&D done within the firm (in-house R&D) or outside the firm through a 
contract or an agreement (external R&D). Also, purchasing services may take place in 
Spain or abroad, and the suppliers may be firms of the same group, firms outside the 
group, public institutions, universities, etc. With this in mind, we  use the term R&D 
outsourcing for the purchases of R&D services (without taxes) from firms or other 
organizations outside the group (if the company belongs to a group) and the term R&D 
offshoring (oss) for the purchases of R&D services abroad, regardless of the location of 
the provider. International outsourcing will be part of both concepts. 
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In our database, around 7% of firms engaged in offshore R&D activities during the 
period. In the manufacturing sector R&D offshoring is greater than in the services 
sector: 8% of manufacturing firms purchase R&D services abroad, while for service 
firms this percentage is 5%. Among R&D offshorers, around 74% belong to the 
manufacturing sector, while 26% belong to the services sector. These percentages 
remain rather constant over time.  
  
In addition, the presence of R&D offshorers is higher in high and medium tech sectors 
(see Table 1). As Añón et al. (2010) point out, unlike low technology sectors, firms with 
high levels of capital intensity or large firms are more likely to offshore high-tech 
activities because of their ability to manage capital flows, cash flow, and benefits 
through other countries.      
 
 
Table 1 
 R&D offshoring by activity sector and technology class 
 
 Number of observations 
Activity Technology class Firms without R&D offshoring 
Firms with 
R&D offshoring Total 
Services 
Low technology 8,672 (96%) 319 (4%) 8,991 
High & medium technology 5,548 (94%) 378 (6%) 5,926 
Total  14,220 (95%) 697 (5%) 14,917 
Manufacturing 
Low technology 10,216 (94%) 701 (6%) 10,917 
High & medium technology 12,712 (91%) 1,229 (9%) 13,941 
Total  22,928 (92%) 1,930 (8%) 24,858 
Total 37,148 (93.4%) 2,627 (6.6%) 39,775 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Notes: Percentages over the total in each row are shown between parentheses. See the correspondence of 
high and medium-tech activities and low activities and the two-digit NACE Rev.2 class in Annex 1. 
 
 
 
The information included in the PITEC also allows for distinguishing which part of total 
employment in the firm corresponds to researchers devoted to R&D activities. The term 
researcher refers specifically to professionals who work on the creation of new 
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concepts, products or processes, methods and systems, and on the management of 
respective projects.7 This R&D employment (LR&D) is our measure of high-skilled labor 
demand. In our sample, the demand for researchers from the years 2004 to 2009 is half 
in manufacturing firms half (3.6) of what it is in services firms (7.1).  
 
As for wages, the average wage for researchers (wR) has been obtained from the PITEC 
as the quotient between total remunerations to researchers and R&D employment.8 As 
can be seen in Table 2, regardless of the activity sector, the average wage of researchers 
is higher in firms with more than 200 employees that offshore R&D activities. In 
particular, the highest salaries are obtained by researchers that work in large firms that 
offshore R&D and operate in high & medium-tech services sectors. In this case, the 
average wage is 47.5% higher when compared with workers in firms with similar 
features in the manufacturing sector.   
 
Table 2 
 Average wages (in €) of researchers by offshoring strategy, activity and size 
 
 SMEs  (less than 200 employees) 
Large firms  
(200 employees or more) 
  All firms 
Firms without 
R&D 
Offshoring  
Firms with 
R&D 
Offshoring
All 
firms 
Firms without 
R&D 
Offshoring  
Firms with 
R&D 
Offshoring
Services 46,078 45,793 51,189 63,570 62,727 77,522 
High & medium-tech  43,531 42,981 51,063 77,367 75,657 99,856 
Manufacturing 47,511 47,237 52,799 63,600 61,156 74,253 
High & medium-tech  48,928 48,599 54,535 64,676 63,792 67,688 
Total  46,937 46,650 52,340 63,110 61,192 74,548 
Source: Own calculation from database PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
 
 
The definitions of the rest of the variables included in the theoretical model are as 
follows. Domestic innovation expenditures (inn) are obtained as the sum of in-house 
R&D expenditures (excluding the remunerations to R&D employment), domestic R&D 
outsourcing and other innovation expenditures (on acquisition of machines, services, 
                                                 
7 We exclude technicians or assistants in administrative tasks associated with R&D activities from this 
concept. 
8 We have used sectoral price indexes to homogenize the monetary magnitudes of different years. The 
year 2007 is considered the base year. In the case of wages, we use harmonized labor cost indexes by 
activity class provided by the Spanish Institute of Statistics. 
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and equipment, acquisition of external knowledge, preparation for production and 
distribution, training, and introduction of innovations). For manufacturing firms, total 
output (Y) is obtained as sales deflated using sectoral price indexes published by the 
Spanish Institute of Statistics9.  Because there is no data in our database about total 
labor costs, as a proxy of the wages of other employees (wO), we use the average wage 
of technicians and assistants in administrative tasks associated with R&D activities. 
These jobs have a lower level of qualification. It is assumed that product prices and the 
rest of the input prices are the same for all the firms in the same industry. This is 
equivalent to introducing sectorial dummies in the model.10    
 
Additionally, as control variables we include dummy variables reflecting whether the 
firm is an exporter, belongs to a high or medium-tech activity sector, has more than 
50% of foreign capital or is a large firm. As Bernand et al. (2007) point out, exporters 
are larger, more productive, more capital and skill-intensive and pay higher wages than 
non-exporters, and Mayer and Ottaviano (2008) suggest that FDI-makers perform better 
than exporters. In addition, in many countries there is a correlation between firms that 
import intermediate inputs and those that export (Bernand et al., 2007). Therefore, the 
exporting character of a firm will be indirectly reflecting the offshoring of intermediate 
manufacturing inputs, which is an omitted variable in our model since there is no 
information about it in the database.  
 
As for firm size, following the theory of human capital (Hamermesh, 1980, 1993; 
Kremer 1993; Dunne and Schmitz, 1992), the most skilled workers would be employed 
by large firms due to aspects such as the complementarity between physical and human 
capital, the advantages of matching skilled workers with other skilled workers, and the 
better capacity to amortize fixed costs associated with the hiring of skilled employees. 
Furthermore, as efficiency wage models show, given that monitoring costs are higher in 
large firms, it would be preferable for them to hire skilled workers, pay good wages, and 
create good working conditions as a way to avoid the constant search for workers and as 
an incentive for employees to remain in the firm (Bulow and Summers, 1986).  
 
                                                 
9 There are not any series of sectoral price indexes for services activities with the level of sectoral 
disaggregation needed for the analysis.  
10 When the model is estimated as a fixed effects model in panel data using a within-groups estimator, 
these dummies disappear. 
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In Table 3, the descriptives of the main variables used in the estimations are shown. 
Near 62% of firms are exporters, with the percentage higher in the manufacturing sector 
higher than in the services sector. In addition, in almost 10% of firms the presence of 
foreign capital exceeds 50% of ownership.  
 
  
Table 3 
 Sample averages of the main variables 
 
Variables All Firms Manufacturing firms  
Services 
firms 
Domestic innovation expenditures (inn) (in logs) 11.8 11.8 11.8 
Exporterd (% observations) 61.9 77.5 35.0 
Foreign capitald (% observations) 10.7 13.2 6.5 
High and medium-tech activity sectord (% obs.) 53.6 59.1 45.3 
International technological cooperation (% obs.) 15.5 15.1 16.5 
Large firmd (% observations) 18.9 20.6 16.1 
Output  (Y) (in logs) - 16.2 - 
Proportion of foreign support for R&D (%) 0.06 0.02 0.12 
Quantity of foreign support for R&D (in logs) 0.04 0.01 0.08 
R&D employment (LR&D)  4.8 3.6 7.1 
R&D employment (LR&D) (in logs) 0.36 0.21 0.62 
R&D offshorerd (% observations) 6.9 7.7 5.3 
R&D offshoring (oss) (in logs) 0.77 0.89 0.59 
Total employment (L) (n. of employees) 236.7 180.7 340.4 
Wages of researchers (wR) (in logs) 10.6 10.7 10.6 
Wages of other employees (wO) (in logs) 8.0 8.3 7.4 
Number of observations 33,134 20,893 11,920 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Note: d = dummy variable 
 
 
4.  Results 
 
In this section, we present the evidence obtained from the estimation of the labor 
demand function in equation [5]. Because of the log-linear specification of the demand 
function, estimated coefficients of continuous explanatory variables can be interpreted 
as elasticities.  
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Given the panel structure of the data, we have estimated the model, alternatively 
assuming alternatively a fixed effects (FE) model and a random effects (RE) model, and 
we use a Hausman specification test to choose among them. As it is well known, in the 
FE model the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is not restricted, and nothing is 
assumed regarding the correlation structure between the individual effects and the 
explanatory variables, as the formers are treated as parameters to be estimated 
differently for each firm. However, in a random effects model assumptions must be 
made about the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity, and this is difficult to establish 
especially when the unobservable effects are correlated with other explanatory 
variables. 
 
In our estimates, the coefficients of the FE model have been obtained using a within-
groups estimator, while the coefficients of the RE model come from a Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) estimator. In both cases, we previously test the normality assumption of 
errors, so that there exist heteroskedastic and first order autocorrelation.11 To correct 
these problems we calculate panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates.12 
 
In addition, notice that to develop the theoretical model we have assumed that the firm 
minimizes costs in two stages: first, it chooses the quantity of traditional inputs, and 
afterwards chooses the proportion in which it will import material and service inputs. 
However, these decisions could be simultaneous. To control for the potential 
endogeneity of R&D offshoring, we also estimate the model using instrumental 
variables approaches. In particular, we consider two supplementary variables as 
instruments: a dummy variable capturing the existence of technological agreements with 
foreign partners (international technological cooperation), and the percentage of 
internal R&D expenditures financed by foreign companies (proportion of foreign 
support for R&D). Sargan overidentification tests are used to see the validity of these 
instruments in each specification. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the FE and RE models without instruments, as well as the 
estimations with instrumental variables by FE two stage least squares (FE2SLS), by RE 
                                                 
11 In all cases, a modified Wald test is used to assess whether there exist is heteroskedasticity, as being the 
null hypothesis of constant variance is rejected. Additionally, a Wooldridge test confirms the presence of 
first order autocorrelation. These tests are available from the authors upon request. 
12 We use the “xtpcse” command in Stata. 
14 
 
two stage least squares (RE2SLS), and by Baltagi’s error component two-stage least 
squares (EC2SLS)13, respectively, for all innovative firms. 
 
 
Table 4 
Demand for researchers (in logs). All innovative firms 
 
  FE RE FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
R&D offshoring (in logs) 0.009*** 0.025*** 0.078*** 0.128*** 0.239*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Domestic innovation expenditures 
(in logs) 
0.052*** 0.124*** 0.047*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wages of researchers (in logs) -0.125*** -0.106*** -0.127*** -0.125*** -0.131***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Wages of other employees (in logs) -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large firm 
 
0.440*** 
 
0.441*** 0.380*** 
(0.015) (0.028) (0.038) 
Exporter 
 
0.091*** 
 
0.147*** 0.128*** 
(0.008) (0.022) (0.030) 
Foreign capital 
 
0.107*** 
 
0.035 -0.073 
(0.016) (0.035) (0.047) 
Manufacturing firm 
 
-0.217***
 
-0.236*** -0.271***
(0.013) (0.029) (0.039) 
High and medium-tech manufact. 
 
0.258*** 
 
0.235*** 0.230*** 
(0.010) (0.025) (0.034) 
High and medium-tech services 
 
0.457*** 
 
0.457*** 0.443*** 
(0.018) (0.032) (0.044) 
Hausman (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Test of joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000 
Sargan over-identification test χ2(1)=2.5 χ2(1)=4.9  
     p-value 0.114 0.027  
Number of observations 33138 33138 31718 33174 33174 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors between brackets. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All 
regressions include the constant. Hausman reports the p-value from a test under the null hypothesis that 
unobserved firm effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. The test of joint significance of the variables 
reports the p-value of a Wald test except in the case of the FE2SLS estimates, where the p-value 
corresponds to an F-test. The instruments used are: quantity of foreign support for R&D and international 
technological cooperation. 
 
                                                 
13 Baltagi’s EC2SLS, is a matrix- weighted average between 2SLS and FE2SLS, and therefore provides 
estimates for time invariant variables. See Baltagi (2008), chapter 7, section 7.1. 
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When models without instrumental variables are considered (columns (1) and (2)), the 
Hausman test confirms the existence of a correlation between observable explanatory 
variables and individual firm effects, so the coefficients from the FE model are the 
consistent ones under the assumption of strict exogeneity of independent variables. 
However, as most control variables are time-invariant and disappear in the within 
estimator, we keep the results from the RE model to have an intuition about their impact 
on labor demand for researchers.14  
 
In both cases, R&D offshoring has a positive effect on the demand for researchers. 
However, as we have mentioned previously, we must be cautious when interpreting this 
result as a causal relationship between R&D offshoring and the demand for R&D labor: 
the estimated coefficient could be biased upward if they were simultaneously 
determined by the firm. Nevertheless, the estimates by instrumental variables 
procedures (columns (3) to (5)) confirm the existence of a positive relationship, with the 
elasticity being between 0.08 and 0.24 depending on the assumption about the errors. In 
particular, the coefficient of the FE2SLS model implies that if R&D offshoring doubles, 
the demand for researchers will raise by about 8%.   
 
Therefore, for this specific type of highly qualified employment, the evidence about the 
impact of R&D offshoring seems to suggest the existence of a positive association 
between R&D employment and imported R&D services. This is consistent with both the 
hypothesis that they are strategic complements, and the prevalence of a scale effect: an 
increase in offshoring would make the firm more efficient and competitive, increasing 
the demand for its product and for all types of employment. The result is also in line 
with previous empirical evidence that, with other levels of aggregation in the data, 
suggests that service offshoring increases high skilled employment (Crinò, 2010).   
 
As for the rest of the variables, unsurprisingly the average wage of researchers has a 
negative impact on their demand, the elasticity near -0.13. The wages of other 
employees also have a negative relation with the employment of researchers, although 
the magnitude of this elasticity is lower. Domestic expenses on innovation have a 
positive effect on R&D employment, which is coherent with Trefler’s (2005) views, 
                                                 
14 We have also performed RE2SLS including industry dummies for 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 classes, and 
the main results remain unchanged. These estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
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which indicates that in recent years there has been a rapid growth in services that 
involve simultaneously involve innovation, intensive processes in technology, and 
employment for white-collar workers.  
 
All the control variables behave in accordance to the predictions of economic theory. 
When taking into consideration the variables that appear in the estimations by RE, we 
observe that exporters, companies in high and medium-tech sectors, especially in 
services activities, and multinational and large firms tend to hire more researchers. In 
addition, the dummy variable for manufacturing firms reflects that this kind of company 
demands less R&D employment. 
 
As has been previously argued, authors such as Jensen (2009) state that during the last 
decade, offshoring has been redirected from manufacturing to services. For that reason, 
in what follows the results are analyzed separately for the manufacturing sector and the 
services sector (see Tables 5 and 6). In both samples all explanatory variables keep in 
general their signs and significance in general with respect to previous estimates for all 
innovative firms.  
 
In addition, when only firms in the services sector are analyzed, R&D offshoring shows 
a positive association with the demand for researchers, as the elasticity is higher than in 
the whole sample. In this case, if R&D offshoring doubles, the demand for researchers 
will raise by around 11% (see column (3) in Table 5).  Once again, this suggests that 
labor demand can be affected through the scale effect or that R&D labor and imported 
R&D services are complements inside the firm.  
 
The same positive relationship is obtained in the sample of manufacturing companies 
(see Table 6). However, in this case the elasticity of R&D employment to R&D 
offshoring is half of what it is in services, showing that the demand for highly skilled 
labor is more sensitive to changes in offshoring in the latter sector, which is probably 
due to the nature of services offshoring that we are considering in this study.   
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Table 5 
Demand for researchers (in logs). Services firms 
 
  
FE RE FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Offshoring (in logs) 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.106*** 0.196*** 0.360*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.032) (0.029) (0.036) 
Domestic innovation expenditures 
(in logs) 
0.073*** 0.165*** 0.066*** 0.082*** 0.070*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Wages of researchers (in logs) -0.162*** -0.161*** -0.161*** -0.160*** -0.162*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) 
Wages of other employees (in logs) -0.041*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Large firm  0.380*** 0.417*** 0.485*** 
  (0.029) (0.055) (0.080) 
Exporter 0.134*** 0.175*** 0.121 
  (0.016) (0.044) (0.063) 
Foreign capital 0.057*** -0.078 -0.247* 
  (0.033) (0.084) (0.119) 
High and medium-tech sector 0.428 *** 0.423*** 0.415*** 
  (0.018) (0.042) (0.060) 
Hausman (p-value) 0.000 0.075 0.000 
Test of joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan over-identification test  χ2(1)=1.9 χ2(1)=4.1  
     p-value 0.167 0.044  
Number of observations 11922 11922 11258 11925 11925 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors between brackets. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All 
regressions include the constant. Hausman reports the p-value from a test under the null hypothesis that 
unobserved firm effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. The test of joint significance of the variables 
reports the p-value of a Wald test except in the case of the FE2SLS estimates, where the p-value 
corresponds to an F-test. The instruments used are: quantity of foreign support for R&D and international 
technological cooperation. 
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Table 6   
Demand for researchers (in logs). Manufacturing firms 
 
  
FE RE FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Offshoring (in logs) 0.007*** 0.024*** 0.056*** 0.094*** 0.181*** (0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Domestic innovation expenditures 
(in logs) 
0.039*** 0.099*** 0.036*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wages of researchers (in logs) -0.107*** -0.080*** -0.110*** -0.105*** -0.111*** (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Wages of other employees (in logs) -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large firm  0.482*** 0.520*** 0.418*** (0.017) (0.028) (0.040) 
Exporter 0.060*** 0.121*** 0.111*** (0.009) (0.022) (0.030) 
Foreign capital 0.128*** -0.003 -0.045* (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) 
High and medium-tech sector 
0.265*** 0.248*** 0.247*** 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.025) 
Hausman (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test of joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan over-identification test  χ2(1)=3.3 χ2(1)=3.1  
     p-value 0.070 0.080  
Number of observations 21216 21216 20422 21249 21249 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors between brackets. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All 
regressions include the constant. Hausman reports the p-value from a test under the null hypothesis that 
unobserved firm effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. The test of joint significance of the variables 
reports the p-value of a Wald test except in the case of the FE2SLS estimates, where the p-value 
corresponds to an F-test. The instruments used are: quantity of foreign support for R&D and international 
technological cooperation. 
 
 
To study this question more deeply, estimates in Table 7 split the sample of services 
firms in two subsamples, one for firms operating specifically in the sector of Scientific 
research and development, and one for the rest of the services firms.15  
 
According to this criterion, the results establish that the elasticity of R&D employment 
to imported R&D services is larger when we exclude the firms in the R&D sector from 
the analysis. However, in this latter industry, the association is much weaker and even 
                                                 
15	For	simplicity,	in	this	case	we	only	show	the	results	obtained	with	IV	procedures.		
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disappears in the FE2SLS model.  This suggests that for firms in R&D activities the 
scale effect could be partially compensated by a substitution relation between both 
inputs. 
 
Table 7 
Demand for researchers (in logs). Services firms 
  
  
Except firms in scientific 
research and development 
Only firms in scientific 
research and development 
  
FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Offshoring (in logs) 0.137** 0.224*** 0.389*** 0.054 0.088* 0.108** 
(0.044) (0.037) (0.044) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) 
Domestic innovation expenditures  0.060*** 0.079*** 0.070*** 0.139*** 0.174*** 0.170***
(in logs) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Wages of researchers (in logs) -0.161*** -0.155*** -0.161*** -0.188*** -0.192*** -0.190***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
Wages of other employees (in logs) -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.021***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Large firm   0.346*** 0.397***  1.904*** 1.892***
   (0.046) (0.063)  (0.235) (0.247) 
Exporter  0.130*** 0.096  0.336** 0.328* 
   (0.037) (0.051)  (0.13) (0.136) 
Foreign capital  -0.001 -0.131  -0.413 -0.489 
   (0.074) (0.098)  (0.290) (0.306) 
High and medium-tech sector  0.238*** 0.262***    
   (0.036) (0.050)    
Hausman (p-value)  0.010 0.000  0.636 0.8615 
Test of joint significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan over-identification test  χ2(1)=0.8 χ2(1)=0.1  χ2(1)=0.2 χ2(1)=2.0  
      p-value 0.371 0.724  0.635 0.161  
Number of observations 9,560 10,220 10,220 1,685 1,705 1,705 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors between brackets. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All 
regressions include the constant. Hausman reports the p-value from a test under the null hypothesis that 
unobserved firm effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. The test of joint significance of the variables 
reports the p-value of a Wald test except in the case of the FE2SLS estimates, where the p-value 
corresponds to an F-test. The instruments used are: quantity of foreign support for R&D and international 
technological cooperation. 
 
 
Finally, in Table 8  we proceed to estimate the conditional labor demand for researchers 
(equation [3]) in the manufacturing sector, given that it is the only sector in which we 
can take the firms’ real output into consideration. With this estimation we aim to 
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disentangle the presence of the scale effect previously mentioned from the potential 
complementarity association between R&D employment and imported R&D services. 
As can be seen in Table 8, after adding the output to the specification, the effect of 
R&D offshoring on the demand for researchers remains positive and significant, 
although the elasticity is smaller. This would confirm that they are complements to 
manufacturing firms. 
 
 
Table 8 
Conditional demand for researchers (in logs). Manufacturing firms 
 
  
FE RE FE2SLS RE2SLS EC2SLS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Offshoring (in logs) 0.006*** 0.022*** 0.054*** 0.089*** 0.166*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) 
Domestic innovation expenditures 
(in logs) 
0.038*** 0.087*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Wages of researchers (in logs) -0.109*** -0.095*** -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.115***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Wages of other employees (in logs) -0.028*** -0.030*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Large firms   0.289***  0.346*** 0.271*** 
(0.018) (0.030) (0.042) 
Exporter  0.016  0.065** 0.062* 
(0.010) (0.022) (0.029) 
Foreign capital  0.059**  -0.023 -0.059** 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.022) 
High and medium-tech sector  0.297***  0.266*** 0.270*** 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.024) 
Output (in logs) 0.048*** 0.097*** 0.047*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
Hausman (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Test of joint significance  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sargan over-identification test  χ2(1)=2.5 χ2(1)=2.0  
    p-value 0.111 0.158  
Number of observations 20,895 20,895 20,112 20,926 20,926 
Source: Own calculation from the PITEC 2004-2009. 
 
Notes: Estimated standard errors between brackets. Coefficients significant at: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. All 
regressions include the constant. Hausman reports the p-value from a test under the null hypothesis that 
unobserved firm effects are uncorrelated with the regressors. The test of joint significance of the variables 
reports the p-value of a Wald test except in the case of the FE2SLS estimates, where the p-value 
corresponds to an F-test. The instruments used are: quantity of foreign support for R&D and international 
technological cooperation. 
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To check robustness, we have re-estimated the regressions presented in Tables 4 to 8 
using alternative measures for wages and domestic innovation expenditures, but the 
results remain basically the same.16  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The process of offshoring has been done in different ways throughout the years. Before 
the 1990s, the objective of this strategy was mainly to reduce cost, especially in the 
manufacturing sector. In the first decade of the new millennium, this phenomenon 
expanded to services activities, especially with the development of ICTs, the 
exploitation of new markets, and the development of new products. 
 
Therefore, researches have worried about the causes, effects, and tendencies of this 
phenomenon. With respect to the studies that seek to analyze the consequences of 
offshoring on labor markets, one of the main debates has focused on how materials and 
services offshoring affect the demand for skilled and unskilled workers, or on their 
impact on wages and welfare.  
The objective of our study is to contribute to this debate by analyzing the impact of 
offshoring on the demand for one of the most qualified workers: researchers involved in 
R&D activities. We examine a particular type of offshoring: the purchases of R&D 
services that domestic firms contract from foreign providers. These highly technological 
activities may have a stronger effect on the demand for skilled labor. For the empirical 
analysis we use firm-level data of Spanish companies for the period 2004-2009 and we 
quantify the effects of R&D offshoring within firms that undertake innovative activities.  
We find evidence of a positive relation between R&D offshoring and skilled 
employment for Spanish firms. In particular, the estimates by instrumental variables 
procedures suggest that if R&D offshoring doubles, the demand for researchers will 
raise by about 8 %.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that both inputs are 
strategic complements, and with the existence of a scale effect: an increase in R&D 
                                                 
16 In particular, we have considered the average wage for R&D employment relative to the average wage 
of workers in the sector in which the firm operates. We have also tried to define domestic innovation 
expenditures by excluding not only the remuneration of researchers, but also the remuneration of 
technicians and assistants in R&D activities. The results are available from the authors upon request. 
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offshoring would make the firm more efficient, increasing the demand for its product 
and for all types of employment. This conclusion is also in line with previous empirical 
evidence with industry-level data suggesting that service offshoring increases high 
skilled employment (Crinò, 2010).   
In addition, we find that the elasticity in services firms is double the elasticity in 
manufacturing firms. However, as we would expect given the specific type of 
offshoring considered in this study, the magnitude of the elasticity is lower in the 
subsample of services firms performing R&D activities. In this case, the scale effect 
could be partially compensated by a substitution relation between both inputs.   
From our view, governments should be aware that R&D offshoring by services and 
manufacturing firms is not a threat but an opportunity, because of its complementarity 
with high skilled labor, which can be capitalized as long as public policies include 
programs to retrain and qualify the workforce to perform the required tasks. 
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Annex 1: Sector Classification 
Correspondence of low-tech and high & medium-tech activities and the two-digit NACE 
Rev.2 class 
 
 
NACE Rev. 2  Low-tech manufacturing 
10 - 12 Food, beverages and tobacco 
13 Textile 
14 Wearing apparel 
15 Leather and footwear 
16 Wood and cork 
17 Paper and paper products 
18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
19 Coke and refined petroleum products 
22 Rubber and plastic products 
23 Other non-metallic mineral products 
24 Basic metals 
32 Other manufacturing 
31 Furniture 
33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
 High & medium-tech manufacturing  
20 Chemicals and chemical products 
21 Pharmacy 
25 Metal products (except machinery and equipment) 
26 Computer, electronic and optical products 
27 Electrical equipment 
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
29 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
30 Other transport equipment 
 Low-tech services 
45 - 47 Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
49 - 53 Transportation and storage 
55 - 56 Accommodation and food service activities 
64 - 66 Financial and insurance activities 
68 Real estate activities 
69 - 71, 73 - 75 Other activities (except R&D services) 
77 - 82 Administrative and support service activities 
85 (except 854) Education 
86 - 88 Human health and social work activities 
90 - 93 Art, entertainment and recreation 
95 - 96 Other service activities 
 High & medium-tech services  
58 - 63 Information and communication 
72 Scientific research and development 
 
 
